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CRIMINAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
John Alexander Robinson∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Can a criminal law remedy a constitutional violation? In Wilson
v. Libby, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
was faced with that very question. There, Valerie and John C. Wilson
sued I. Lewis Libby, Jr., Chief of Staff to Vice President Richard Cheney and Assistant for National Security Affairs, alleging that Libby violated the Wilsons’ First and Fifth Amendment rights by disclosing to
1
the public Ms. Wilson’s identity as a CIA agent. Premising liability
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar2
cotics, which established that a federal court may, in the absence of
any congressional authorization, fashion a damages remedy for the
victim of an unconstitutional act committed by a federal officer if the
3
court has jurisdiction to hear the case, the Wilsons argued that a
damages action was necessary because no other congressionally
4
created form of relief was adequate to give them recourse. Without a
Bivens remedy, the Wilsons contended that their constitutional rights
5
would not be fully vindicated.
In turn, Libby argued in part that the court need not create an
implied action in damages because Congress had already given the
Wilsons an avenue of recourse—the Intelligent Identities Protection
6
Act (IIPA). That criminal statute, according to Libby, was sufficient
∗
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1
Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77–83 (D.D.C. 2007). More specifically,
Ms. Wilson’s name appeared in an article written by Robert Novak, who identified
Ms. Wilson as a CIA agent. Id. at 79–80. That article was published by the Chicago
Sun Times and the Washington Post on July 14, 2003. Id. In their complaint, the Wilsons alleged that Vice President Richard Cheney and Libby were involved in “outing”
Ms. Wilson as an operative. Id. at 80.
2
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3
Id. at 388–90.
4
Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
5
Id.
6
50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426 (2006). Under the IIPA, anyone who
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to address the Wilsons’ constitutional injuries. Therefore, Libby
concluded, the district court should respect Congress’s decision to
exempt federal officers, such as himself, from damages by declining
to fashion Bivens relief for injuries arising out of a federal officer’s in8
tentional disclosure of a private citizen’s CIA status.
In rejecting Libby’s IIPA argument, the court found that the statute did not amount to a convincing reason for it to restrain its Bivens
9
hand. The obvious shortcomings of such a course of action, according to the court, were plainly evident. First, nothing in the text of the
law or in its legislative history indicated that Congress ever contemplated the IIPA to serve as the sole means of recourse for those claiming constitutional injuries for intentional disclosures of their covert
10
identity. Second, even if such an indication existed, the claim that
the IIPA was sufficient to address the Wilsons’ constitutional injuries
was dubious at best because it did not provide them with even the
11
possibility of obtaining substantive relief.
Accordingly, the court
stated that it would not refrain from giving the Wilsons an adequate
12
damages remedy.
Although the Wilson court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ Bi13
vens claims, it seems to have left open the possibility that it would at
least entertain the argument that a criminal law can remedy a constitutional violation if the criminal law contains some indication that it
was meant to preempt Bivens relief and provides substantive recompense to the victim of that crime. Indeed, the claim that a criminal
law could remedy a constitutional violation seems increasingly meritorious given the unwillingness of the Supreme Court of the United
having or having had authorized access to classified information that
identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies
such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the
United States, shall be fined under [T]itle 18 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
Id. § 421(a).
7
Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 92–93.
10
Id. at 92. Specifically, the court found that “the legislative history shows that
Congress was responding to a series of high-profile incidents . . . and the IIPA was a
targeted effort to punish such behavior criminally.” Id.
11
Id. at 92–93; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426 (2006).
12
Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 92–93.
13
Id. at 93.
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States and lower federal courts to create damages remedies for claimants who lack alternative congressional relief or who can only ob14
tain less-than-adequate relief.
The basis for this argument rests, in part, in the Constitution itself, which does not on its face delegate a remedy-making power to
15
any specific branch of the federal government. It has unquestionably been assumed that Congress naturally possesses a remedy-making
16
right because of Congress’s authority to craft substantive laws. The
assumption that the federal courts are also imbued with this power
has proven to be more controversial, but that controversy has been
countered on the grounds that federal courts must decide cases and
controversies (both under the Constitution and federal law) and for
17
every right, a remedy must exist, lest the right becomes illusory.
But if federal courts do have the statutory and constitutional authority to fashion relief, how can they do so without offending separa-

14

See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 66 n.6 (1999) (noting that in
the federal-prisoner litigation context, where most Bivens claims originate, 1513 Bivens claims were filed between 1992 and 1994, but only two resulted in monetary
judgments, and sixteen resulted in monetary settlements); Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 344 n.46 (1989)
(“A Bivens defendant is unlikely to settle . . . because the success rate for such defendants (99.75% before appeal) is so high. The defendant has no incentive to settle . .
. because any federal employee sued for actions taken within the scope of his employment receives free representation from the Department of Justice.”); see generally
Note, “Damages or Nothing”—The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
667 (1979) (arguing that Bivens actions are so unsuccessful that individual government officers are unlikely to settle).
15
See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
16
See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1548 (1972); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional
Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1143–44 (1989) (“[I]t is clear that both Congress
and the courts are empowered to fashion remedies for the violation of constitutional
right . . . . The Supreme Court has regularly reminded us that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
the courts.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
17
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Nichol, supra note
16, at 1122. Indeed, as far back as Marbury v. Madison, the Court recognized that
“[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); but see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 265–67
(1978); Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 329–39, 366–72 (1993) (noting that circumstances exist in which the law provides no remedy for the invasion of a legal interest).
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tion of powers, especially when Congress has explicitly or implicitly
excluded damages as a possible remedy against federal officers? Indeed, the Supreme Court has largely agreed that federal courts toe, if
not cross, the separation-of-powers line by giving recourse to a Bivens
18
claimant absent congressional authorization.
In a series of decisions, the Court has strongly suggested that federal courts should refrain from crafting Bivens relief and instead defer to congressional
decisions regarding federal-officer liability for claimed constitutional
19
violations.
But separation of powers is not an insurmountable bar to a federal court in fashioning congressionally unauthorized relief for a par20
ticular claimant. At least when a claimant has no remedy or no constitutionally adequate remedial process to vindicate the constitutional
right that has been violated, the Court has found reason to sustain
21
Bivens actions. The Court, however, has not justified its decisions in
those instances on the basis that the Constitution or federal law compels the Court to give a remedy to one who lacks any relief; rather,
the Court has done so on grounds related to fairness to the Bivens
claimant and the lack of strong federal interests counseling against
22
this course of action. The importance of that distinction cannot be
understated. That distinction suggests that by deferring to statutory
remedies regarding constitutional violations because of separation-ofpowers concerns, the Court is willing to rely on Congress in giving
23
substance and shape to constitutional norms. The practical implication of federal courts deferring to congressional remedies is that in18

See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (noting that “[s]o
long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability” (citing
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425–27 (1988))).
19
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2605 (2007); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73; FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–24; United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983); Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302–05 (1983).
20
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (finding no constitutional limitation preventing a federal court from fashioning a damages remedy against a federal
officer for an alleged Equal Protection violation).
21
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407–10 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
22
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 406–08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23
Dellinger, supra note 16, at 1548 (arguing that “even where the Court concludes that a particular remedy is ‘part and parcel’ of the underlying constitutional
right, Congress is not necessarily barred from substituting an alternative remedial
scheme, provided it affords comparable vindication of the constitutional provision
involved”).
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dividuals, such as the Wilsons, must navigate a maze of complex statutory schemes in search of a remedy that often falls short of making
24
them whole.
This Comment explores the circumstances in which a congressionally created criminal law is a sufficient reason for a federal court
to back away from fashioning a damages remedy for the victim of an
unconstitutional act. Based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding Bivens claims, this Comment argues that in certain instances a criminal law is adequate to supplant a Bivens remedy. Part I
details the few cases in which the Supreme Court has used its powers
to fashion an implied damages remedy directly from the Constitution. Part II addresses the Court’s hesitancy in creating damage relief
and particularly emphasizes the two general exceptions to Bivens
claims. Finally, Part III describes the necessary components of the
criminal law and the context in which this type of remedy is sufficient
to preclude a Bivens remedy. Part III also addresses the shortcomings
of this approach and discusses the normative justifications for permitting a punitive remedy to guarantee an individual’s constitutional
right.
II. BIVENS AND THE PROMISE OF IMPLIED DAMAGES REMEDIES FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY FEDERAL OFFICERS
A. The Origins of Implied Damages Remedies
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar25
cotics, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal
court, acting under a statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction,
can imply a damages remedy against federal officers who have vi26
olated an individual’s constitutional rights. Webster Bivens was at
home with his family one morning in November 1965 when six
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting under color of fed27
eral law, entered his dwelling. Claiming that he violated certain
federal drug laws, the agents arrested Bivens, threatened his family,
28
examined his home, and subjected him to a strip search. Bivens was
29
later interrogated, but no federal criminal charges were brought.
24
25
26
27
28
29

See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–24, 427–28.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 389–90.
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Arguing that the officers acted without a warrant and had no probable cause for his arrest, Bivens sued them for money damages in fed30
eral district court for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Bivens’s case
for failing to state a cause of action because he lacked statutory authority to sue federal officers for monetary damages for Fourth
31
Amendment violations, and Bivens appealed to the Supreme Court.
Rather than dismissing the case as the lower courts had done,
32
the Court entertained Bivens’s claim. The Court justified that decision on the grounds that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the
33
federal-question statute and that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make
34
good the wrong done.” As such, the question before the Court was
whether the Fourth Amendment permitted Bivens to exact money
35
damages from federal officers for their invasion of his rights. The
Court found particularly crucial the fact that a damages remedy was
Bivens’s only hope of relief: the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment, prohibiting a prosecutor from using or relying upon
36
evidence illegally obtained by federal officers, did not apply because
37
no criminal proceeding was brought against Bivens, and state tort
remedies were “inconsistent [with] or even hostile” to the guarantees
38
of the Fourth Amendment.
Further, the Court determined that
damages were the “ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal in39
terests in liberty.”
30

Id. Bivens sought $15,000 in monetary damages from each officer for their actions. Id.
31
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90.
32
Id. at 389.
33
Id. at 398–99 (Harlan, J., concurring). At the time that Bivens was decided, the
federal-question statute provided that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
34
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
35
Id. at 389.
36
See generally Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that evidence obtained in contravention of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a federal criminal proceeding).
37
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394–95.
38
Id. at 394.
39
Id. at 395.
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Although finding that the Fourth Amendment permitted an ac40
tion in damages, the Court stated that its inquiry did not end there.
Rather, the Court suggested that it would refrain from crafting relief
if there was an “explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may
not recover money damages from the agents” or any “special factors
counsel[ing] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con41
gress.” Finding that neither exception applied to the case at hand,
the Court permitted Bivens to seek monetary damages against the
42
federal transgressors.
In a notable and revealing concurring opinion, Justice Harlan
made clear that the Court did not need statutory authority from
43
Congress to accord compensatory relief to Bivens. According to Justice Harlan, federal courts had the “presumed” power to fashion
equitable relief directly under the Constitution based on a general
44
statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, Justice Harlan
argued, the belief that the federal tribunals lacked the authority to
imply a damages remedy directly under the Constitution based on that
same general statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction was inde45
fensible, if not illogical. Further, Justice Harlan stressed that the
fact that the federal tribunals routinely implied damages remedies into statutory schemes mooted the criticism that the Court was imper46
missibly making substantive relief for Bivens. That proved, Justice
Harlan continued, that the federal courts were more than capable of
making the considered policy decisions normally thought to be re47
served for Congress. Moreover, Justice Harlan emphasized that the
Bill of Rights existed to “vindicate the interests of the individual in
the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities,”
which suggested that federal courts had to distance themselves from
48
expressed congressional desires regarding constitutional remedies.
40

Id. at 396–97.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399–400, 402–07 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44
Id. at 404.
45
Id. at 404–06.
46
Id. at 402–03 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–34 (1964)). Notably, the practice of implying private remedies into statutory schemes was later discredited and abandoned by the Court. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979). In Bivens, the Court implied a damages remedy directly from the Constitution itself. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97.
47
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402–03.
48
Id. at 407.
41
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To him, the question was whether compensatory relief was “‘neces49
sary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the interest asserted.”
Justice Harlan wrote that “[i]n resolving that question, . . . the range
of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad
as the range [] a legislature would consider with respect to an express
50
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.” In considering the
“traditional judicial remedies” used by federal courts to vindicate a
51
legal interest, Justice Harlan concluded that a damages remedy was
52
“appropriate” because for Bivens “it is damages or nothing.”
53
In Davis v. Passman, the Court applied the reasoning of Bivens
54
in implying a damages action directly under the Fifth Amendment.
In that case, Davis brought an equal-protection claim against her employer, Congressman Otto Passman, because he fired her on account
55
of her gender. Davis sought monetary and equitable relief for her
injuries against Passman, but Davis lacked statutory authority to sue a
56
member of Congress for the violation that she asserted. The Court
relied heavily on Bivens in stating that damages were appropriate because it had general subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Davis’s consti57
tutional claims and because Davis could not avail herself of any al58
ternative federal remedy. Finding damages to be the traditional
59
form of relief for equal protection infringements, the Court found
49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at 408 n.8.
52
Id. at 410.
53
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
54
Id. at 248.
55
Id. at 230. Representative Passman stated that he fired Davis from her position
as his administrative assistant because he preferred a man for the job. Id.
56
Id. at 231. Specifically, Davis sought reinstatement of her position as an administrative assistant; however, because Passman had resigned from the House of Representatives by the time of Davis’s lawsuit, her claims for reinstatement were unavailing.
Id. Davis had no standing to sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because § 717 of
Title VII of that Act, as amended in 1972, excluded congressional employees from
protection. Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, § 717, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
11, 86 Stat. 103, 111–12 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(2006)). Nor did Davis have any standing to sue Passman for violating the rules of
conduct governing the House of Representatives because those rules were promulgated and adopted after the alleged unconstitutional behavior occurred. Davis, 442
U.S. at 243 n.21.
57
Davis, 442 U.S. at 236. The Court considered § 1331(a), the statute for federalquestion jurisdiction, to be the basis for Davis to sue for an invasion of her constitutional right. Id.
58
Id. at 243–44 n.21, 245–46.
59
Id. at 245.
50
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neither an explicit congressional declaration nor any special factors
60
counseling hesitation against giving Davis recourse. Accordingly,
the Court sustained Davis’s claims for direct monetary relief against
61
Passman for his unconstitutional behavior.
62
The last case to extend Bivens was Carlson v. Green, in which the
63
Court applied the doctrine to an Eighth Amendment violation. Unlike Bivens and Davis, the plaintiff in this case was not without recourse: the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provided the decedent’s
64
estate with a damages action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Thus, the Court faced the question of whether to extend Bivens relief
to a plaintiff who could avail himself of alternative congressional re65
lief. In deciding in the affirmative, the Court found in the FTCA’s
legislative history that Congress intended to preserve Bivens claims,
which silenced the argument that the FTCA represented an express
66
declaration by Congress that Bivens relief was precluded. Further,
the Court reasoned that even if such language did not exist, an implied damages remedy was appropriate because the FTCA was wholly
67
inadequate to relieve the injuries claimed by the decedent’s estate.
The Court particularly was concerned with the fact that, unlike the
FTCA’s remedies, damages against federal officers would deter them
68
from engaging in unconstitutional behavior in the future. Because
of the FTCA’s inadequacy, the Court found no impediment to fa69
shioning a freestanding damages remedy for the plaintiff.

60

Id. at 246–48.
Id. at 248–49.
62
446 U.S. 14 (1980).
63
Id. at 16. In Carlson, a federal prisoner suffered an acute asthmatic attack while
in the custody of officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Id. at 16 n.1. The
prison officials failed to timely treat or find help for the prisoner, who subsequently
died from his ailment. Id. at 16. The prisoner’s estate then sued the federal officers
for money damages. Id.
64
Id. at 19–20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
65
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–20.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 21. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the FTCA remedies were inadequate to preclude the Court from implying a Bivens damages remedy for four reasons: (1) a Bivens remedy had more of a deterrent effect on the individual federal officer who has committed the constitutional violation; (2) a Bivens suit allows for
punitive damages, while the remedies offered by the FTCA do not; (3) a plaintiff invoking the FTCA remedies is not entitled to a trial by jury; and (4) a plaintiff attempting to invoke the remedies under the FTCA must prove that he would have
standing to sue in the state where the particular misconduct occurred. Id. at 20–23.
68
Id. at 21.
69
Id. at 25.
61
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B. Bivens as Constitutional Common Law
Despite the apparent simplicity of the doctrine—that a federal
court can create a damages remedy for a plaintiff who has suffered a
constitutional injury at the hands of a federal officer if the court has
70
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case —Bivens has generated
substantial debate over the extent to which the Constitution compels
a federal court to fashion a remedy in damages for an otherwise re71
medy-less plaintiff. Indeed, a cursory reading of Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson suggests that when a plaintiff lacks a constitutionally adequate
remedy and a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his
claim, the Constitution in fact commands the federal courts to give
72
the plaintiff some form of recourse. Therefore, when damages are
70

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 399 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Notably (despite being beyond the
scope of this Comment), that statement presents an interesting question regarding
the federal judiciary’s role in regard to Congress within the system of separation of
powers. In the context of a Bivens claim, the question can be phrased as the following: would a federal court have the power to hear a Bivens claim and imply a damages
remedy for a constitutional violation committed by a federal officer if Congress has
not provided the victim of the wrongdoing with a constitutionally adequate remedy
and has also repealed § 1331? Perhaps an even more interesting question is whether
Bivens can be read to give state courts the power to fashion freestanding constitutional remedies given that Congress does not have to create lower federal courts at
all. Several scholars have discussed those and related questions. See generally Akhil
Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse—1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229
(1994); Akhil Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions and Answers About Converse—1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1993); Dellinger, supra note 16; Nichol, supra note 16; Rosen, supra note 14; Joan Steinman, Backing Off
Bivens and the Ramifications of This Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights,
83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984).
71
Compare Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1135–36 (1978) (“Bivens is a constitutional (not
common law) decision. It is a constitutional decision, we believe, because it prevents
the Fourth Amendment from being rendered a ‘mere form of words’ in the relevant
sense of that phrase.”), with George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional
Dogs—Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 291 (1989) (“The view
that Bivens is constitutional law in the sense of being compelled by the document itself, fairly interpreted, has attracted some academic support . . . . [I]t is a somewhat
stretched reading of Bivens itself, let alone subsequent cases.”), and Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term: Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1975) (suggesting that the Bivens decision is an example of the Court’s
constitutional common-law powers). See also Nichol, supra note 16, at 1124.
72
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (“[W]e presume that justiciable
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts. And, unless such rights
are to become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that their own
constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective
means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional
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the “ordinary” mode of vindication for the infringed right, federal
73
courts have the duty to fashion that type of relief for the claimant.
But if this is so, then it is difficult to reconcile that understanding of the doctrine with the Court’s practice in determining whether
74
a claimant has alternative remedies. Why should a federal court
care about other congressional remedies if the constitutional right in
question demands a damages action when that right is violated? Even
assuming that the purpose of this inquiry is to see if the claimant al75
ready has adequate recourse that makes added relief unnecessary,
the Bivens exceptions themselves cast doubt on the constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine. One way to account for the exceptions
is to say that when neither applies to a particular case, then the Constitution compels a damages remedy for an individual with no alter76
native, adequate relief. The Court, however, in later cases has implicitly rejected that approach because the Court has stated that a
Bivens damages remedy must be the “best way to implement a constitutional guarantee” and “is not an automatic entitlement no matter
77
what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest.”
Thus, even if an individual has no other remedy and damages are
“ordinary” for the asserted right that has been violated, a Bivens ac78
tion may still not be the “best way” for a federal court to proceed.
Perhaps the one way to read Bivens and its two exceptions as a
coherent rule is to consider it completely within the federal court’s
rights.”) (emphasis added); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (noting that “‘[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury’” (emphasis added) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803))).
73
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] court of law vested
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit has the power—and therefore the duty—to make principled choices among traditional judicial remedies.”) (emphasis
added).
74
See, e.g., Davis, 442 U.S. at 245 (noting that plaintiff had no alternative form of
recourse).
75
The claimant, however, unlikely would have adequate recourse because if the
claimant has a congressionally created damages remedy at his disposal, he would
have no need to bring the Bivens action in the first instance unless, as Wilson v. Libby,
498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007), demonstrates, his congressional remedy in damages is directed against a federal agency rather than against a federal officer, and the
plaintiff desires to collect from the officer personally.
76
Davis, 442 U.S. at 242–45; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397–98.
77
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007).
78
The Court has yet to address the question of whether the “best way” is code for
“required by the constitutional right in question.” The Court likely would not hold
that way, however, given the circular nature of that argument.
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discretion to fashion a damages remedy for an alleged unconstitu79
tional act committed by a federal officer. Under this view of Bivens,
the Constitution does not compel but, rather, merely permits federal
courts to fashion adequate relief for a claimant who lacks it (assum80
ing, of course, that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim).
Federal courts, in the view of Justice Harlan, use reasoned judgment
to determine if a Bivens remedy is the “best way” to vindicate a consti81
tutional right in a particular case. That necessarily involves balancing the individual’s need to obtain recompense against the concerns
codified in the two Bivens exceptions, which generally touch on
82
broader governmental and constitutional values. Clearly, the fact
that a claimant has no remedy is material to this balancing of inter83
ests, but it may not be decisive. Although the distinction between
Bivens as a constitutional decision and Bivens as a “constitutional
84
common law” decision appears academic, it has been crucial to the
Court’s understanding of and attitudes toward the doctrine in later
cases.
III. THE EXCEPTIONS BECOME THE LAW: WHEN SPECIAL
FACTORS PRECLUDE IMPLIED DAMAGES REMEDIES
In the twenty-eight years since Carlson, the Court has declined to
85
extend Bivens to any new contexts and has cautioned against fashioning a freestanding remedy in damages except in the narrowest
86
circumstances. A few current justices have even gone so far as to call
79

See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concur-

ring).
80

Davis, 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brown, supra note 71, at 291;
Monaghan, supra note 71, at 28.
81
Bivens, 403 U.S. 407–08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82
See, e.g., id.
83
See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001); United States v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
84
This term was coined by Professor Monaghan in his influential article The Supreme Court 1974 Term: Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975).
85
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has only heard two Bivens cases and has
declined to extend the doctrine in both instances. In Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (2001),
the Court remarked that “[s]ince Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants.” Similarly, in Wilkie v.
Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604–05 (2007), the Court expressed great caution in implying a damages remedy for any unconstitutional act committed by a federal officer.
Id. at 2597–98.
86
See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604–05; Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68; Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988).
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an end to the practice of implying remedies for constitutional viola87
tions in all instances. Federal circuit and district courts almost universally deny Bivens remedies, and federal officers rarely settle Bivensstyle cases against them because of the low success rate of those cas88
es. What can explain the Court’s near complete reversal in its attitude toward implied damages remedies against federal officers?
Since its inception, the Bivens doctrine has been rife with con89
troversy. The main criticism of Bivens, one which has resonated
most loudly in the Court’s recent decisions involving the doctrine, is
90
that it undermines separation of powers. Indeed, if the Constitution
does not compel damages actions to vindicate a specific constitutional right (a supposition which the Court seems to have embraced in its
91
most recent cases ), then it would appear that a federal court acting
92
under its Bivens power judicially crafts substantive relief. Not only
do federal courts lack the institutional competence to weigh compet93
ing policy considerations in fashioning remedies, but any decisions
that federal courts make regarding a federal officer’s liability in dam94
ages necessarily impermissibly chills federal decision making. Un-

87

See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2608 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Malesko, 534 U.S.
at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition . . . . I would
limit Bivens . . . to the precise circumstances that they involved.”).
88
See supra note 14.
89
Brown, supra note 71, at 264–67.
90
See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 53–54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 253 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (The Court
must show “comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of government . . . . Even
where the authority of one branch over a matter is not exclusive . . . we have recognized that the principle of separation of powers continues to have force as a matter
of policy.”); Davis, 442 U.S. at 249–50 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597–99; Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68–71; FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 484–486 (1994); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988); United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90
(1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
92
Bush, 462 U.S. at 388–90; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 53–54 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 430
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not be making
“judicial legislation” by implying a damages remedy when Congress had not provided
one).
93
See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425–27; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 52–53 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Congress
“has the facilities and competence” for the task of creating legislation and accompanying remedies).
94
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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95

der this view of Bivens, a federal court usurps Congress’s prerogative
96
to make laws, incidental to which is the power to create remedies.
Such separation-of-powers concerns therefore trump an individual’s
need for a remedy in damages in most, if not all, cases because the
Constitution does not require such a remedy to exist in the first
97
place. Even if the Constitution gives federal courts the ability to
create constitutional remedies, federal courts should not (and perhaps cannot) do so unless Congress has explicitly or implicitly re98
served room for the courts to exercise that power. In the absence of
an express congressional declaration to preserve Bivens, separation of
powers demands the federal courts’ respect for congressionally
99
created relief.
Most commentators have roundly criticized the Court for refusing to recognize the federal judiciary’s duty to fashion relief for a re95

On the other hand, if one views federal-court action as constitutionally mandated when a claimant has no remedy, then the dispute over Bivens takes on a greater constitutional dimension. At that level, the attack on Bivens as judicial lawmaking
resonates with less clarity because a federal court is not “making” substantive law so
much as it is finding that the Constitution requires a damages remedy that Congress
has failed to provide. Rather, that disagreement over Bivens reflects a more fundamental disagreement about the constitutional justifications for permitting federal
courts to create remedies based solely on their “inherent” powers when acting under
a transient grant of statutory jurisdiction. That was the position taken by then-Justice
Rehnquist in Carlson. According to Justice Rehnquist, a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Congress was insufficient authority for a federal court to create a damages
remedy against a federal officer for the officer’s unconstitutional behavior. Id. at 41.
Interestingly, Rehnquist believed that a federal court had the power to fashion equitable relief based on a statutory grant of jurisdiction because federal courts historically wielded such power. Id. at 42–44. Justice Rehnquist later abandoned that view by
the time the Court decided Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–
67 (2001).
96
When Congress expressly or implicitly exempts federal officers from damages
actions, a federal court exacting Bivens relief is, in one sense, acting in contravention
to what Congress deems appropriate (or rather inappropriate) relief for the alleged
constitutional injury. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1979) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nichol, supra
note 16, at 1143.
97
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597–600 (2007); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69–70;
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 421–22 (1983).
98
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (“It would be hard to infer that Congress expected the
Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand . . . .”); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (“So long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.”).
99
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (noting that “[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers
adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the
course of its administration, [the Court] ha[s] not created additional Bivens remedies”).
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100

medy-less plaintiff.
They argue that if the Constitution does not
compel the federal courts to find a remedy for a claimant who lacks
one, then the judicial branch is relegated to a secondary role in the
101
enforcement of constitutional norms.
Congress would, in effect,
dictate the mode of vindication regarding constitutional rights and
102
tangentially control their interpretations. Further, even if the Constitution does not force the federal courts’ hands when the courts are
presented with a remedy-less plaintiff, the commentators attack as illogical the general hesitancy of those tribunals to fashion Bivens relief
103
under the guise of judicial lawmaking. The idea that Congress can
fashion remedies is premised on Congress’s power to enact legisla104
tion and create legal rights in the first instance. But Congress does
105
not create constitutional rights; those rights come from the People.
Thus, the demands for respecting separation of powers seem less
pressing, even non-existent, in the case of constitutional remedies because the federal courts are giving effect to guarantees that are not
106
the product of Congress.
Those arguments, however, have fallen mostly on deaf ears
among the justices of the Court. In practice, the distaste for Bivens
manifests itself in the federal courts’ policy of deference toward statu107
tory and administrative remedies.
The breadth of that deference
has become so substantial that it is now assumed that statutory regimes foreclose Bivens relief unless Congress expressly intends to pre108
serve it.
That is true even when the statutory remedy is either in109
adequate as compared to an implied damages remedy or wholly
110
The end result has been a
unavailable to a particular claimant.
100

Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 303–05 (1995); Brown, supra note 71, at 285–86; Nichol, supra note 16, at
1132; Rosen, supra note 14, at 337–40; Steinman, supra note 70, at 281.
101
Bandes, supra note 100, at 320–22; Nichol, supra note 16, at 1132.
102
Bandes, supra note 100, at 316; Brown, supra note 71, at 285–86.
103
See Bandes, supra note 100, at 316 (arguing that “[e]ven under a rigidly separationist view of the Constitution, when considered in light of the core judicial role of
giving meaning to constitutional values as a bulwark against government overreaching, judicial remedies are not merely legitimate, but crucial”); see also Brown, supra
note 71, at 285–86; Steinman, supra note 70, at 295–96.
104
Nichol, supra note 16, at 1129–30.
105
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
106
Brown, supra note 71, at 285–86; Steinman, supra note 70, at 281.
107
See Bandes, supra note 100, at 294; Rosen, supra note 14, at 338.
108
Brown, supra note 71, at 286.
109
See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426–27 (1988).
110
See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 (1988); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1983).
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near complete subversion of the Bivens doctrine through the use of
111
As one commentator aptly put it, “Bivens conits two exceptions.
112
tained the seeds of its own demise.”
A. The Bivens Exceptions: When Congress Expressly “Says So”
Under Bivens, when Congress expressly declares one of its remedies to be the sole form of relief for a victim of an unconstitutional
act, a federal court is incontestably precluded from implying an addi113
tional remedy in damages.
For that exception to apply, Congress
need not recite any special words or proclaim that a particular reme114
dy excludes a Bivens damages remedy.
If the legislative history or
any other source evinces congressional intent to make a particular
remedy the exclusive form of relief for a particular constitutional vi115
olation, an implied Bivens remedy cannot be sustained.
116
Although the Court has reiterated that test in numerous cases,
117
it has yet to find a law that satisfies the first Bivens exception. How
directly Congress must speak to trigger the first exception is unclear,
but the Court’s decisions indicate that only an express and unequi118
vocal statement by Congress will preempt Bivens. Presumably, when
Congress has in fact spoken, the Court’s role is solely to determine
whether the congressional relief is nonetheless constitutionally ade119
quate to vindicate the underlying right.
B. The Bivens Exceptions: When Special Factors Counsel Hesitation
The special-factors exception is the main vehicle that the Court
uses to defeat attempts at resurrecting Bivens, and that exception is
111

Brown, supra note 71, at 264–66.
Bandes, supra note 100, at 291.
113
See Nichol, supra note 16, at 1143.
114
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 n.5 (1980).
115
Id.
116
See, e.g., id. at 19; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247 (1979).
117
See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22–24.
118
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20 n.5.
119
That is because without a finding of constitutional adequacy by the Court, the
remedy would not serve its purpose of vindicating the underlying constitutional
right. If the Court were to approve a remedy that did not pass constitutional muster,
significant due process concerns would ensue for the victim of the act and separation-of-powers concerns would also arise. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Commentators agree that the Court must at least ensure that congressional remedies
meet certain minimum criteria. Dellinger, supra note 16, at 1549; Nichol, supra note
16, at 1143; Steinman, supra note 70, at 281.
112
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rooted in the belief that a Bivens remedy offends “bedrock principles
120
of separation of powers.” The clearest examples of that exception
involve claimed constitutional violations arising out of federal activities, such as military service, where the Constitution expressly gives
121
another branch of government near complete authority or control.
In such cases, a federal court using its Bivens power is ostensibly act122
ing without constitutional authority to do so. Where there is no direct constitutional provision justifying Bivens preclusion, the affront
to “bedrock principles” manifests itself most commonly in a federal
court’s failure to show comity toward congressional decisions regard123
ing federal-officer liability.
At least when Congress has created a
statutory scheme, the design of which implies an intent to exclude
federal officers from damages for violations of that statute, the concerns over Bivens as sounding in judicial lawmaking resonate with
124
particular clarity. In other situations, the offense is more subtle and
arises out of concern over the federal judiciary’s competency to weigh
competing policy concerns when asked to extend Bivens liability
125
beyond the unconstitutional acts of federal officers.
Regardless of
the reasoning used by a federal court, however, the special factors exception has clearly proven to be an incredibly malleable standard that
has been used by courts to avoid fashioning an implied damages re126
medy in almost all contexts.
1.

Special Factors: Constitutional Violations Incidental
to Federal Military Service

The criticism that Bivens steps beyond the parameters of separation of powers is most vividly apparent when federal courts are asked
to imply a damages remedy for constitutional injuries arising out of a
127
claimant’s military service.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
states that Congress has the power to “make rules for the Govern-

120

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001).
See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987).
122
Id. at 682–84.
123
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988).
124
Id.
125
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70–71; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
126
See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604–05 (2007) (holding that the
“serious difficultly of devising a workable cause of action” amounted to a special factor for precluding Bivens liability); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486 (holding, in part, that a Bivens action directly against a federal agency amounted to a special factor because of
the “potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government”).
127
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987).
121
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ment and Regulation of the land and naval Force . . . .”
When a
federal court implies a damages remedy against a military officer, the
court gives the claimant substantive relief in the absence of congres129
sional authorization.
That would seem to directly flout Article I’s
language, which calls on Congress to make those types of liability de130
Recognizing this conflict, the
cisions involving military officers.
Court has ruled that federal courts cannot fashion Bivens relief in that
131
area.
Rather, a court’s duty is merely to ensure that adequate re132
medies are on the books to redress a plaintiff’s injury. Whether the
claimant can actually obtain recompense under those schemes is of
133
no consequence.
134
Chappell v. Wallace illustrates that point. In Chappell, the plaintiffs were naval servicemen who were discriminated against on account of their race, and they sued their commanding officers on the
135
basis of equal-protection violations.
The plaintiffs attempted to
hold their superiors liable under the Uniform Code of Military Jus136
tice (UCMJ); however, the UCMJ required that other superior of137
ficers bring forth the plaintiffs’ claims before a military tribunal.
After no such superior officer asserted the plaintiffs’ claims, the

128

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
130
Id. at 301–04.
131
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682.
132
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
133
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 706 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “no intramilitary
system” existed that provided the plaintiff with a remedy for his constitutional injury).
134
462 U.S. 296 (1983).
135
Id. at 297. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their commanding officers
had denied them promotions and exacted harsher penalties on them because of
their race. Id.
136
10 U.S.C. § 938 (1976).
137
In pertinent part, the UCMJ states the following:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his
commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior
commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against
whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for
redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible,
send to the Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint,
with the proceedings had thereon.
Id. § 938, art. 138.
129
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plaintiffs petitioned the Court to provide them with a remedy in
138
damages because they had no alternative recourse.
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ Bivens claim, the Court stated that the
Constitution gave Congress near “plenary control over rights, duties,
and responsibilities in the framework of the military establishment,
including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military
139
discipline.”
Acting pursuant to that power, Congress created the
UCMJ and the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, both of
which, according to the Court, adequately addressed the plaintiffs’
140
claimed injuries.
A Bivens remedy, the Court wrote, would make
federal officers liable in damages when Congress had not provided
for such liability in either of its remedial statutes. The mere threat of
liability would have the undesirable consequence of chilling “decisive
action” on the part of commanding officers and the “disciplined re141
sponse” of their subordinates. That, in turn, would significantly alter “the unique disciplinary structure of the [m]ilitary” that Congress
had created and undermine Article I’s directive for Congress to make
142
regulations regarding the military. Further, even if Article I could
somehow be read to permit the Court to fashion relief for the plaintiffs in this case, the Court stated that it would not do so because it
could not “conceive of an area of government activity in which the
143
courts have less competence.” Thus, the Court held that “enlisted
military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a
144
superior officer for alleged constitutional violations.”

138

Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297–98. The plaintiffs also asked the Court to provide
them with injunctive relief. Id.
139
Id. at 301.
140
Id. at 302–03. The Board for the Correction of Naval Records provides another method by which a member of the military “‘may correct any military record . . .
when [the Secretary of the Navy acting through the Board] considers it necessary to
correct an error or remove an injustice.’” Id. at 303 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)
(1976)). The Board has the discretion to promote the officer whose rights have
been violated or provide him with back pay. § 1552(a)(2), (c). Further, a federal
court can review and set aside any decision by the Board where evidence exists that
shows that the Board’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial
facts. See Grieg v. United States, 640 F.2d 1261, 1268 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
141
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. Specifically, the Court remarked that a commanding
officer’s “decisive action” and a subordinate’s “disciplined response” would both be
undermined if the commanding officer were exposed to a judicially created damages
remedy for his actions. Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 302 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
144
Id. at 305.
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145

In United States v. Stanley, the Court extended the reasoning of
Chappell by foreclosing Bivens actions altogether in the context of mil146
itary service. The plaintiff in Stanley was an officer in the U.S. Army
who was subject to a series of experiments by military scientists without his knowledge and in contravention of his Fifth Amendment
147
rights.
Premising liability under Bivens, the plaintiff argued that
Chappell was distinguishable from his case on the ground that Chappell
involved constitutional misconduct by the plaintiffs’ commanding officers, and in the plaintiff’s case, the misconduct came at the hands of
148
officers with no superior relationship to him.
Because of that distinction, the plaintiff argued that he could not invoke intra-military
remedies, such as the UCMJ, and, therefore, had no alternative re149
course.
The plaintiff also argued that the “unique disciplinary
structure” of the military was not implicated in his case, as it was in
Chappell, because the defendants’ acts were not incidental to the
150
plaintiff’s service.
The Court found both of the plaintiff’s arguments unavailing.
The officer-subordinate relationship, according to the Court, was not
151
crucial to the holding of Chappell. The Court in Chappell refrained
from crafting an implied damages remedy based on Article I’s
mandate “for Congress ‘to make Rules for the Government and Regu152
lation of the land and naval Forces.’” Thus, any Bivens remedy for
injuries arising out of one’s service would necessarily disrupt the “military regime” and undermine Congress’s constitutional authority in
153
that area.
Flatly rejecting the plaintiff’s other argument that his
154
constitutional injuries were not incidental to his service, the Court
found the case indistinguishable from Chappell. Accordingly, the
145

483 U.S. 669 (1987).
Id. at 675–76.
147
Id. at 671–72. The plaintiff was told by officers that the experiment would test
the durability of newly issued military clothing and equipment against chemical attacks. Id. In reality, however, the experiment was designed to test the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) on the human body. Id. Throughout the monthlong experiment, the officers periodically administered doses of LSD to the plaintiff
while he slept. Id. The plaintiff first learned of the actual objectives of the experiment seventeen years later when the military sent him a letter asking him to come
back for follow-up studies. Id.
148
Id. at 679.
149
Id. at 683.
150
Id. at 679–80.
151
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680–81.
152
Id. at 682 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
153
Id. at 682–83.
154
Id. at 680–81.
146
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Court considered it “irrelevant to a ‘special factors’ analysis whether
the laws currently on the books afford[ed]” the plaintiff complete re155
lief to redress his injuries, and the Court suggested that Congress
would have to decide whether to give recourse to officers “whenever
156
the injury arises out of activity ‘incidental to service.’”
2.

Special Factors: Upsetting a Comprehensive
Congressional Statute

Offense to the foundations of separation of powers also occurs
where federal courts are asked to augment the remedies found in a
157
comprehensive congressional statute with Bivens relief.
Congress
has the obligation and duty to legislate and fashion substantive laws
158
and the tangential power to create remedies.
The Constitution
gives Congress that power, in part, because Congress is accountable
to the people and is therefore competent to weigh multiple factors
159
and make complex policy decisions. In light of those concerns, the
Court has directed the federal tribunals to refrain from invoking Bivens when the “design” of a statutory scheme suggests that Congress’s
failure to include damages against federal officers as a possible reme160
dy is not inadvertent.
The crucial factor triggering that Bivens exception relates to the statute’s comprehensiveness—both in terms of
its breadth in regulating a field of federal activity and the remedies it
161
offers for its violation.

155

Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
157
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007) (asking whether there is “any
alternative, existing process for protecting the [constitutional] interest [that]
amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a
new and freestanding remedy in damages” (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378
(1983))); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988).
158
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411–12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nichol, supra note 16, at 1143.
159
That is because a federal tribunal is limited to hearing and resolving only certain “cases” and “controversies” actually before the tribunal. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
Indeed, Congress is the body generally charged with making those decisions and
finding consensus amongst conflicting viewpoints. See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425–
27; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 52–53 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bivens,
403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “has the facilities and
competence” for the task of creating legislation and accompanying remedies).
160
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423.
161
Id. at 423–27.
156
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162

In Bush v. Lucas, the Court first invoked the special factors exception to deny Bivens relief because of the existence of a compre163
hensive statutory regime. Bush, an employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), was demoted by his
superiors because he told reporters that his job was worthless and a
164
waste of taxpayer dollars. Claiming that he suffered retaliation for
speaking his mind, Bush invoked his statutory right under the Civil
Service Act to challenge his demotion as unlawful before the Federal
165
Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA). The FEAA found no retaliatory firing, and Bush asked the Appeals Review Board of the Civil Ser166
vice Commission to rehear his claims. While the appeal was pending, Bush filed suit in state court (later removed to federal district
167
court), premising liability against his supervisors under Bivens. Arguing that the statutory remedies were incomplete because they did
not authorize money damages against his superiors, Bush claimed
that Bivens relief was necessary to fully redress his constitutional in168
jury.
162

462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Id. at 367–68.
164
Id. at 369.
165
Id. at 369–70. Under the version of the Civil Service Act in place at the time of
Bush’s demotion, federal employees had the right to challenge any removal or demotion that was not made for reasons of efficiency. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a)
(1976); Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (Jan. 17, 1962); Exec.
Order No. 11,491, § 22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605, 17,614 (Oct. 29, 1969). Under that
hodgepodge of rules and regulations, the federal agency pursuing the demotion was
required to give to the employee thirty-days notice of the adverse action and the reasons for the demotion. 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(a) (1975). The employee, in turn, had
the right to answer the charges, make sworn statements, and examine the evidence
upon which the agency relied for the demotion. § 752.202(b). The agency had the
ultimate discretion in deciding whether to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5 U.S.C. §
7501(b) (1976); 5 U.S.C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1976); 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(g) (1983).
The final decision regarding the employee’s demotion was placed in the hands of an
officer in that agency who was of higher rank than the official who suggested the
demotion. 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(f) (1975). The employee had the right to appeal that
decision to the FEAA. §§ 752.203, 772.101. On appeal, the FEAA, acting like a trial
court, would conduct an evidentiary hearing, and the employee had the right to
bring forth and cross-examine witnesses. § 772.307(c). The employee further had
the right to judicial review of any adverse decision made by the FEAA, 5 U.S.C. §
7703 (Supp. V 1976), and could also ask the Civil Service Commission’s Appeals Review Board to reopen his case, 5 C.F.R. § 772.310 (1975). The burdens of proof and
persuasion were placed on the federal agency to show that it had sufficient cause for
the demotion. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385–88 nn.26–35 (1983).
166
Bush, 462 U.S. at 370. Ultimately, the Appeals Review Board concluded that
Bush’s demotion was unlawful and that Bush was entitled to $30,000 in back pay. Id.
167
Id. at 371.
168
Id. at 372.
163
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At the outset, the Court found no express or implied congressional intent that the remedies in the Civil Service Act were meant to
169
be exclusive.
Thus, the case turned on whether “special factors”
counseled against a new remedy in damages for Bush. The Court clarified that that exception required a federal court to “make the kind
of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tri170
bunal . . . before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” That
“remedial determination,” the Court wrote, amounted to reasoned
judicial discretion involving a balancing of the claimant’s need for
damages against broader governmental and separation-of-powers
171
concerns.
The Court found the existence of special factors for interrelated
reasons. Crucial to the Court’s analysis was the fact that Bush could
obtain back pay and reinstatement of his position under the Civil
Service Act, and although those remedies were incomplete, the remedies were nonetheless constitutionally adequate to vindicate his
172
Free Speech right.
As such, an implied damages remedy was not
Bush’s only source of recourse, as in Bivens and Davis, and the Civil
Service remedies were not ineffective in securing his constitutional
173
rights, as in Carlson. According to the Court, that meant that Bush
174
was simply asking for more relief than Congress had provided.
On the other hand, the Court viewed the Civil Service Act as a
comprehensive statutory scheme that provided “meaningful” re175
course to federal employees. Indeed, the Court catalogued the history of the statute to emphasize that throughout the years Congress
had carefully constructed the most appropriate remedies for misbe176
havior in the context of federal employment.
The fact that Congress excluded money damages as a possible remedy for someone in

169

Id. at 378.
Id.
171
Id. at 378–80.
172
Bush, 462 U.S. at 379 n.14. Presumably, when the Court declared that the remedies under the Civil Service Act were constitutionally adequate, the Court meant
that the remedies provided a certain minimum level of relief to the victim to compensate him for his injuries, and that the remedies have a deterrent effect upon the
wrongdoer. Without the direct relief to the victim or the deterrent effect on the
wrongdoer, the violated right would not be respected or protected from further invasion.
173
Id. at 388.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 386.
176
Id. at 381–88.
170
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Bush’s position, the Court wrote, was therefore not likely inadver177
tent.
Because of those reasons, the Court stated that
[t]he question is not what remedy the court should provide for a
wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step,
with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should
be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the
178
constitutional violation at issue.

In answering that question in the negative, the Court wrote that because of Congress’s historical and institutional capacity to make those
types of policy decisions, it was up to Congress “to evaluate the impact
of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the effi179
ciency of the civil service.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that it
would not augment the Civil Service Act with a new remedy in dam180
ages for Bush simply to give him complete relief.
181
In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court again denied Bivens relief, but
this time the Court based the denial on the existence of a federal
182
benefits program.
In Chilicky, the plaintiffs’ disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act were terminated because state
authorities administering the program determined that the plaintiffs’
183
various disabilities no longer existed.
As per their statutory right
under the Act, the plaintiffs challenged those decisions before an
administrative law judge and succeeded in restoring their previously
184
denied benefits.
The plaintiffs then sued the federal officers who
177

Id. at 388–89.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 388.
179
Id. at 389.
180
Id. at 388–90.
181
487 U.S. 412 (1988).
182
Id. at 428–29.
183
Id. at 417. Title II of the Social Security Act allows individuals to receive disability benefits if both of the following requirements are met: (1) the individual has
paid into the social security program for a certain number of years; and (2) the individual has a recognized physical or mental disability that prohibits the individual
from being gainfully employed. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (d) (Supp. IV 1982). Under
Title II, designated state welfare agencies coordinate the program at the state level
and provide benefits to disabled individuals who meet the above criteria so long as
their disability persists. Id. §§ 421(a), 423(a)(1). To determine whether a disability
persists, the Social Security Administration is required to review a beneficiary’s disability status every three years. Id. § 421(i).
184
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 417. A Title II beneficiary who fails to carry his burden of
proof before a continuing disability review board and loses his benefits is permitted
to appeal that decision to an administrative law judge. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (Supp.
178

ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT)

2009]

1/13/2010 5:25 PM

COMMENT

1383

designed the disability review system, claiming that the entire review
procedure had violated their due process rights and that that, in turn,
185
had caused the denial of their benefits. The plaintiffs argued that a
Bivens remedy was necessary because having their benefits restored
after months of delay, which was the only remedy to which they were
entitled under Title II, was wholly inadequate to protect their due
186
process rights. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed that the restoration of their benefits addressed the statutory violations of Title II but
187
left them with no redress for their constitutional injuries.
The issue again before the Court was whether any special factors
188
weighed against the creation of a new remedy in damages. Similar
to Bush, the Court noted that the plaintiffs in this case could, and did,
avail themselves of an alternative and adequate remedial process—
189
Title II—to vindicate their constitutional rights. The case therefore
came down to whether the Court should augment the constitutionally
sufficient Title II remedies, though lacking in a damages action
against federal officers, with Bivens relief to make the plaintiffs
190
whole.
The Court cautioned against doing so and stated that the
special factors exception
has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent. When
the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has
provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its admin191
istration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.

IV 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929–404.965 (1987). At the time that this case was before
the Court, individuals who lost their benefits were not entitled to receive any payments while their appeal was pending before the administrative law judge. Chilicky,
487 U.S. at 415–17. Further, Title II beneficiaries were not entitled to any judicial
review by Article III courts for violations of any of the provisions of the Social Security statute. Id.
185
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 418–19.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 418–20, 427. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of their constitutional
injuries, they suffered severe emotional distress as well as loss of food and shelter. Id.
at 419.
188
Id. at 422–23.
189
Id. at 425. With little discussion, the Court stated that the restoration of benefits was “meaningful” and considerably more elaborate than the remedies at issue in
Bush. Id. Thus, the restoration of benefits was sufficient to vindicate the plaintiffs’
due process rights even though that remedy had resulted in months of delay and unjustified hardship. Id.
190
Id.
191
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423.
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In concluding that Title II’s exclusion of damages against federal officers was not inadvertent, the Court emphasized the comprehensive
nature of the statute (the Social Security Act “affect[ed] virtually
every American”) and the fact that it provided “‘an unusually protective [multi]-step process for the review and adjudication of’” most vi192
The Court
olations of the statute, including the plaintiffs’ claims.
wrote that Congress likely chose not to make Title II officers liable in
damages because of the resulting “difficulties and expense in recruit193
ing administrators for the [Title II] programs.”
Any implied damages remedy, the Court stated, would therefore undermine Con194
gress’s decision to exempt Title II officers from the same.
As to the plaintiffs’ argument that the Title II remedies only addressed their statutory injuries, the Court found “no distinction between compensation for a ‘constitutional wrong’ and the restoration
195
of statutory rights that ha[ve] been unconstitutionally taken away.”
The Court continued by stating that “statutory violations caused by
unconstitutional conduct” do not “necessarily require remedies in
addition to the remedies provided generally for such statutory viola196
tions.”
Consequently, the Court ruled that special factors—
including the existence of a comprehensive statutory scheme—
197
precluded it from implying a new remedy in damages.
During the 2007 term, the Court again struck down Bivens relief
for a claimant where statutory remedies were available even though
the Court found that the statutory remedies lacked any inference of
198
Bivens preclusion. In Wilkie v. Robbins, the plaintiff, Frank Robbins,
purchased land in Wyoming subject to a right-of-way easement held
199
by the Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
When Robbins took title to the land, however, BLM failed to rerecord its ease200
ment, thereby extinguishing its claim on the premises. After failing
to convince Robbins to regrant the property interest, BLM employees
engaged in a series of direct and covert tactics designed to force
201
Robbins into submission.
Over the course of six years, BLM em192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id. at 424 (quoting Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984)).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428.
127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007).
Id. at 2593.
Id.
Id. at 2593–94.
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ployees denied permits to Robbins, did not inform him of administrative review procedures, purposefully trespassed on Robbins’s lands,
instigated and incited animosity between Robbins and his neighbors,
broke into Robbins’s house to find evidence of possible permit viola202
tions, and secretly videotaped Robbins and the guests at his resort.
Robbins eventually sued several BLM officials under Bivens, claiming
that the officers were retaliating against him for exercising his Fifth
Amendment right to property by keeping the government off his
203
lands.
The Court began by noting that for each specific act of wrongdoing, Robbins had numerous ways to adequately redress his injuries,
including state trespassing laws, administrative review procedures to
challenge the denial of permits, and tort-based remedies for illegal
204
invasion.
At the same time, however, the Court stated that this
“patchwork” of relief was significantly different from the remedial
mechanisms that the Court found sufficient to preclude Bivens relief
205
in Bush and Chilicky.
Unlike Bush and Chilicky, where the comprehensiveness of the statutory regimes evidenced a congressional intent
206
to exclude damages as a possible remedy, the Court noted that no
207
Instead, the
comprehensive statute addressed Robbins’s claims.
“assemblage” of remedies available to Robbins required him to go before numerous state and federal forums and expend a considerable
208
amount of time and money to redress his injuries. The Court concluded that Robbins’s available relief neither raised the inference nor
209
indicated that Congress intended to stay the Court’s “Bivens hand.”
But that did not end the Court’s inquiry. According to the
Court, Robbins was not entitled to Bivens relief simply because he had
established that no congressional scheme existed that evidenced an
210
intent to foreclose Bivens relief.
Instead, the Court wrote, “any
freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation
has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter
202

Id. at 2594–96.
Id. at 2596–97.
204
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598–99.
205
Id. at 2600.
206
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424–26 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 381–88 (1983).
207
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600.
208
Id. at 2600–01.
209
Id. at 2600.
210
Id.
203
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what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest.”
The Court continued by stating that the majority of the time, “Bivens
212
relief is not the ‘best way’ to protect a constitutional right.” In fact,
the Court noted only two circumstances where it had found Bivens relief justified—for a plaintiff who had no other remedy and for a
plaintiff who lacked effective alternative relief to vindicate the consti213
tutional right at issue. Robbins did not fall into either one of those
214
The Court, therefore, would have to rely on reasoned
categories.
judgment to determine whether any other reasons suggested denying
215
a damages remedy for Robbins against the BLM officials.
Ultimately, the Court denied Robbins any Bivens relief because
216
of the “difficulty in defining a workable cause of action.”
The
Court’s prior Fifth Amendment retaliation cases premised liability
217
Here, the Court
upon a finding of improper purpose or motive.
wrote, BLM officials had a proper purpose in harassing Robbins: “as a
landowner, the Government may have, and in this instance does
218
have, a valid interest in getting access to neighboring lands.”
For
Robbins to show that BLM officers deprived him of his constitutional
rights, the Court would have to significantly alter its Fifth Amend219
ment retaliation jurisprudence.
The Court declined to do so because it could not define the parameters of that proposed cause of action, and the Court left it to Congress “‘to evaluate the impact of a
220
new species of litigation’ against” public officials.

211

Id. at 2597.
Id.
213
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600.
214
Id. at 2597–98.
215
Id. at 2600.
216
Id. at 2601.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2601–02. For a concise overview of the Court’s retaliation
jurisprudence, see generally Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668 (1996) (holding that an employee who was fired for discussing a topic
of public interest must show “that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected,
and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination”); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding that the government may not retaliate
against an individual who exercises his right to Free Speech); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973) (prohibiting government retaliation for exercising one’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination).
220
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2605 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)).
212
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Special Factors: Extending Bivens Liability Beyond
Federal Officers

The federal courts’ hesitancy to embrace Bivens relief under the
special-factors exception also stems from the courts’ own perceived
incompetence or impotency to make the considered and multifaceted policy decisions that a damages action against federal actors
221
generally entails.
As noted in Carlson, one of the justifications for
the Bivens doctrine is that it deters federal officers from acting un222
constitutionally.
When plaintiffs ask the federal courts to extend
Bivens actions against a new set of defendants, this institutional in223
competence takes center stage. Such policy decisions are generally
deemed to be Congress’s prerogative and, thus, the Court has met
224
with hostility any attempt to extend Bivens beyond its core purpose.
Instead, the Court has instructed the federal tribunals to let Congress
225
establish liability against federal entities for their unlawful acts.
226
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer, the Court declined to extend Bivens to claimed constitutional violations committed by federal agencies. In that case, the plaintiff, John Meyer, was a
227
senior manager of a California bank.
When the bank became financially insolvent, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board directed the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to act as
228
the bank’s receiver under federal law.
The FSLIC hired a special
representative to direct the bank’s operations and, through that rep229
resentative, fired Meyer.
Meyer then sued the representative and
the FSLIC based on his assertion that they unlawfully denied him his

221

See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425–27 (1988); Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 52–53 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “has the facilities and competence” for the task of creating legislation and accompanying remedies).
222
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21.
223
See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (noting that “decisions involving ‘federal fiscal policy’ [by extending Bivens liability] are not [the Court’s] to
make”) (internal quotation omitted).
224
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001).
225
Id. at 72.
226
510 U.S. 471 (1994).
227
Id. at 473.
228
Id. As receiver, the FSLIC had the power to “take such action as may be necessary to put [the bank] in a sound solvent condition.” Id. (quoting National Housing
Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1259 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(1934)) (repealed 1989)).
229
Id.
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“property right . . . to continued employment” at the bank. A jury
found the FSLIC liable under Bivens but denied relief against the
231
special representative on qualified immunity grounds.
After determining that the FSLIC waived its sovereign immunity,
the Court expressed doubt about permitting a Bivens remedy to stand
232
against a federal agency.
The Court stated that it created a freestanding damages remedy in Bivens “in part because a direct action
233
Meyer had other ways
against the Government was not available.”
to exact relief from the FSLIC based in administrative and contrac234
tual law, but Meyer chose not to invoke them because he would
have had difficulty overcoming the defendant’s qualified-immunity
235
defense. But issues of immunity, the Court explained, do not factor
236
Rather, that
into its analysis of whether to sustain a Bivens claim.
decision depends entirely upon reasoned judgment unaffected by
237
whether a particular defendant is judgment proof.
The Court then went on to reject the plaintiff’s Bivens claim
against the FSLIC because a damages action against a federal agency
would “eviscerat[e] . . . the Bivens remedy rather than [amount to] its
238
extension.”
The Court reasoned that, to get around immunity
problems, any plaintiff, given the choice between suing a federal
agency or a federal officer under Bivens, would always seek to hold
239
the agency liable over the officer. If that were to happen, “the de240
terrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.” The Court also
remarked that an implied damages remedy was inappropriate because it would create “a potentially enormous financial burden for
241
the Federal Government.”
Because Congress normally made decisions regarding “‘federal fiscal policy,’” the Court determined that

230

Id. at 474.
Id. at 473–74.
232
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484.
233
Id. at 485 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
234
Id. at 485 n.10.
235
Id. at 485.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 486.
231
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Congress must also decide whether to extend Bivens liability against
242
federal agencies.
243
In Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, the Court reiterated that Bivens liability does not extend beyond the unconstitution244
al acts of federal officers. In that case, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, sued Correctional Services Corporation (“Corporation”), a
private entity, for injuries he suffered because of the negligence of
245
the Corporation’s employees.
Although administrative remedies
246
were available, the plaintiff instead alleged an Eighth Amendment
violation against and sought monetary relief under Bivens from the
247
Corporation and its negligent employees. The plaintiff argued that
because the Corporation was acting under the color of federal law in
248
operating the correctional facility, the deterrent purposes of Bivens
249
would be served.
The Court held that private entities acting under the color of
250
federal law cannot be liable under Bivens for monetary damages.
Relying heavily on Meyer, the Court stated that Bivens “is concerned
solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual offic251
ers.” And as individual officers would likely be judgment proof, extending Bivens liability to private entities, according to the Court,
lacked any deterrent effect at all because a plaintiff would go after the
252
private entity rather than the individual officers responsible. Reiterating that issues of immunity played no role in deciding whether to

242

Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 311
(1947)).
243
534 U.S. 61 (2001).
244
Id. at 73.
245
Id. at 64. The plaintiff suffered from a heart condition that prevented him
from overexerting himself. Id. Although aware of the plaintiff’s debilitating disease,
the Corporation nonetheless placed the plaintiff in a fifth-floor room of the facility.
Id. When one of the Corporation’s employees forced the plaintiff to take the stairs
to his room instead of using the elevator, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack, fell
down the stairs, and was injured. Id.
246
Id. at 72–74. The Court noted that Malesko had numerous alternative remedies at his disposal that were “at least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens.” Id.
247
Id. at 64–65.
248
Id. at 64.
249
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 65.
250
Id. at 74.
251
Id. at 71.
252
Id.
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253

sustain a Bivens claim, the Court concluded that Congress would
have to make that type of liability decision against entities acting un254
der the color of federal law.
IV. PRECLUDING BIVENS EVEN FURTHER:
ARE CRIMINAL LAWS THE NEXT STEP?
Having catalogued the Court’s ambivalence, if not hostility, toward crafting freestanding damages relief, the final question still remains: can a criminal law remedy a constitutional violation such that
a federal court would consider that criminal law to be a “sufficient
reason” to refrain from using its Bivens power?
Wilson is an obvious starting point. In Wilson, the court found
the IIPA insufficient to restrain its Bivens power because that statute
lacked any indication that Congress purposefully desired that federal
officers implicated under the act be free from civil damages, and,
more broadly, the IIPA failed to give the Wilsons any sort of direct re255
compense for their constitutional injuries. Is there any room in this
district court’s opinion to argue that where the design of a congressional criminal law suggests Bivens preemption and that law also gives
substantive relief to the victim of the unconstitutional act, a federal
court therefore has enough justification to deny a claimant Bivens relief? Clearly, the Wilson Court’s first reason is seemingly easy to satisfy
because Congress can suggest whatever it wants in a law’s text or legis256
lative history. Moreover, restitution as damages is commonly tied to
257
criminal laws, which at least superficially addresses the concerns of
the Wilson Court that the victim of an unconstitutional act be given
some type of direct relief. Do additional concerns, either inherent in
the criminal process itself or external, militate against having a criminal law vindicate a constitutional right that has been violated? If so,
what are they? If not, what are the circumstances where a criminal
law will remedy a constitutional violation? Finally, what are the
broader implications of this finding? Answering those questions requires several distinct inquiries. First, how does a criminal remedy fit
into one of the Bivens exceptions? Second, can a criminal law carry
253

Id. at 70 (“Meyer made clear that the threat of litigation and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes no matter that they may enjoy qualified immunity . . . .”).
254
Id. at 72.
255
Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 92–93 (D.D.C. 2007).
256
The Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution protects members of Congress from liability. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
257
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006).
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with it some form of relief to redress the victim of a constitutional injury? Third, is such relief ever adequate to vindicate the victim’s constitutional right? Fourth, what is the broader justification for a federal court deferring or not deferring to a congressional criminal law
instead of fashioning Bivens relief?
A. A Criminal Law as a Bivens Exception
At the outset, a criminal law must fit within one of the Bivens exceptions for it to stay a federal court’s power to fashion damages relief. As discussed above, the two exceptions to the Bivens doctrine are
where Congress expressly declares a remedy to be exclusive (“When
258
Congress Says So”) or when special factors counsel hesitation.
If a criminal law is to preclude Bivens relief at all, it would likely
fit within the special-factors comprehensive-statutory-scheme exception. Although the “When Congress Says So” exception is ostensibly
easy to satisfy—all that needs to appear in the text of the law is some
express statement that “this criminal law is intended to preempt any
259
Bivens action for every constitutional violation herein” —Congress
has never done so in the past, and little indicates that Congress would
260
do so in the future. Similarly, the special-factors military exception
premises Bivens exclusion on grounds relating to Article I’s command
261
for Congress to make regulations in regard to the military. Indeed,
Stanley shows that the Court is not concerned with whether a claimant
has an alternative remedy so much as the Court is concerned with the
disruption of the “unique disciplinary structure of the military” that
262
any Bivens remedy would cause.
The existence of a criminal law
then would not likely have any impact under the special-factors mili263
tary exception. Finally, the fact that a criminal law would likely deter federal officers from acting unconstitutionally does not counsel
against the creation of a freestanding remedy in damages. The Bivens
deterrence principle, or lack thereof, speaks to reasons why a federal
court should not expand the doctrine rather than to justify why anoth258

See supra Parts III.A–B.
See supra Part III.A.
260
Id. Presumably, that is because an incredibly high failure rate for Bivens actions already exists such that Congress is not worried about preempting a judicially
created damages remedy against federal officers. See sources cited supra note 14.
261
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1987).
262
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
263
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683 (noting that “it is irrelevant to a ‘special factors’ analysis
whether the laws currently on the books afford” the plaintiff complete relief to redress his constitutional injuries).
259

ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT)

1392

1/13/2010 5:25 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1359

er remedy is preferable to the exclusion of a freestanding damages re264
As such, the question becomes how a criminal law fits into
medy.
the special-factors comprehensive-statutory-scheme exception.
B. A Criminal Law as a Special-Factors Comprehensive-StatutoryScheme Exception
According to this subset of the special-factors exception, a Bivens
remedy is inappropriate when “the design of a Government program”
suggests that Congress purposefully excluded federal officers from
265
monetary liability for violating provisions in the program. Wilkie informs us that a statute’s breadth in regulating an area of federal activity and the remedial mechanisms that address such a statute’s viola266
tions are generally revealing and indicative of its design. Moreover,
Bush and Chilicky support the proposition that a statute that both is
pervasive in its scope and provides a mechanism that addresses most,
if not all, injuries arising from its breach, creates the inference that
267
Congress intended to preempt Bivens relief.
The Court has not expounded a definitive standard to gauge the
comprehensiveness of a statutory regime. What may be gleaned from
the cases, however, is that the likeliest candidates for the “comprehensive” label are congressional regimes that create statutory rights
268
and purport to govern exclusively the exercise of the rights created.
One need not look any further than Bush and Chilicky to illustrate
that point. The Civil Service Reform Act at issue in Bush protected
federal employees who exercised their First Amendment rights from
retaliation by their employers—a protection that did not previously
269
The Bush Court found the Act “comprehensive” because it
exist.
was the only statute that regulated job security for federal employees,
270
and it did so with great detail. Similarly, Title II of the Social Security Act, under scrutiny in Chilicky, entitled certain Social Security re271
cipients to disability benefits. The Court there extended the “com264

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001).
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988).
266
See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598–600 (2007).
267
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–28; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381–88 (1983).
268
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423–28; Bush, 462 U.S. at 386–88. That is not to say that
only congressional regimes that create statutory rights may be deemed comprehensive. Having a statute that regulates or governs an existing right in a particular area
potentially could be comprehensive in nature.
269
Bush, 462 U.S. at 381–86.
270
Id. at 388.
271
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 414–17, 424–26.
265
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prehensive” label to Title II because Title II exclusively defined and
272
limited the scope of that benefits scheme. Decisions by lower federal courts give further support to that point because the courts have
273
274
found the Privacy Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and the administrative scheme governing veterans’ benefits deci275
sions, all of which create and limit statutory rights, to be comprehensive in nature.
The remedies for the violation of a comprehensive statute are also particularly telling of whether Congress intended to preempt Bivens relief. According to Wilkie, a remedial mechanism must be part
and parcel of the statutory regime giving rise to the violation: if the
relief is “piecemeal” in nature and not codified together with a statute’s provisions, Congress likely did not think of precluding a frees276
tanding damages remedy.
Wilkie also suggests that a remedial mechanism requiring a Bivens claimant to appear before various forums
(i.e., administrative agencies and federal and state courts) to achieve
277
sufficient recourse argues against Bivens preemption.
Additionally, the inference of congressional intent to preclude
Bivens is likely strengthened when the remedial mechanism provides
relief for most, if not all, of the statute’s violations. Not uncommonly,
Congress uses its power over jurisdiction to restrict a federal court to
278
hearing only those claims arising directly under a particular statute.
A remedial scheme that limits federal-court jurisdiction to particular
claims arising under a certain statute certainly gives further weight to
the idea that the statutory remedies are meant to be exclusive. Simi272

Id. at 424–25.
Downie v. City of Middleburg Heights, 301 F.3d 688, 698–99 (6th Cir. 2002);
Sullivan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 944 F. Supp. 191, 195–96 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Williams v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 879 F. Supp. 578, 587–88 (E.D. Va. 1995).
274
Ethnic Employees of Library of Cong. v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1415–16
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
275
Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
276
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2600 (2007).
277
Id. That is not to suggest that a remedial mechanism directing a plaintiff to an
administrative proceeding with a right of appeal to the federal judiciary would violate
that principle. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1983) (holding that the
remedies of the Civil Service Reform Act raised the inference that Congress intended
to preclude Bivens relief even though, to obtain relief, the plaintiff had to appear before an administrative board with the right to appeal the board’s decision to federal
district court). Rather, that point builds upon the previous assertion that “piecemeal” relief, where the Bivens claimant is forced to look to different statutes, regulations, and the common law to find his relief, does not raise the inference of Bivens
preclusion.
278
See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 n.3 (1988).
273
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larly, a mechanism offering relief to all of the statute’s beneficiaries,
rather than only to certain groups, gives credence to a congressional
bias against Bivens relief. That is not to say that the mechanism must
give the beneficiaries complete relief against all violators of the statute. Rather, when all, or substantially all, of the beneficiaries have
some avenue of redress under the statute, Congress more likely considered and rejected other forms of relief than those expressly provided. Indeed, that description unsurprisingly sounds strikingly similar to the doctrine of field preemption, and it has been persuasively
279
argued that the two standards are similar, if not the same.
280
The Federal Food Stamp Program is an example of a congressional scheme that comes close to the scenario just described. First,
the program is comprehensive in its scope: it is a federal-entitlement
program administered by the states and designed to promote the
281
health of low-income individuals.
The program contains detailed
provisions that govern the exercise and use of food stamps and de282
fines those eligible to participate.
Second, the Act contains a remedial mechanism to address violations of the program that likely raises the inference that the remedies
found in the Act are meant to be exclusive. Depending on the particular provision that is breached, power is vested in the Secretary of
Agriculture to bring civil actions, including removal of households or
283
food concerns from the program or monetary penalties against
284
state agencies for transgressions. Individual households are also entitled to administrative and ultimately judicial review of a state agen285
cy’s decision to terminate their benefits. Finally, the Act makes it a
crime for anyone to knowingly take or use a food stamp in an unau286
When an individual is convicted of that crime,
thorized manner.
279

Betsy J. Grey, Preemption of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1127–29 (1992).
280
7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036 (2006).
281
Id. § 2011.
282
See id. §§ 2012–2019.
283
Id. §§ 2020–2021.
284
Id. §§ 2022, 2025(c).
285
Id. §§ 2020(e)(10), (i)(2), 2023.
286
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2006). Specifically, the law states that
whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons, authorization cards, or access devices in any manner contrary to
this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall . . .
be guilt of a felony [if the coupons are valued at $100 or more] . . . or .
. . of a misdemeanor [if the coupons are valued at $100 or less].
Id.
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the statute requires forfeiture to the government of the stamps and
any other property used in the commission of the crime and permits
a court to order the defendant to work to pay “restitution for losses
287
incurred by the United States.” Clearly, this criminal law is aimed at
deterring and punishing the food-stamp recipients themselves for
selling their benefits for profit, but the law can be read to apply to
288
third parties who take and sell the food stamps of another.
Thus,
for all practical purposes, the Act contains remedies for nearly every
contemplated transgression and gives the food-stamp recipients at
least some protection and security of their statutory right.
Under this statutory scheme, there may arise a scenario involving
a food-stamp recipient whose home is broken into by federal Drug
Enforcement officers acting upon an anonymous tip in search of evidence relating to an alleged drug crime. The officers seize the food
289
stamps and, realizing that they entered the wrong house and that
their search was illegal, dispose of the stamps to avoid culpability. As
the Bivens case itself tells us, state remedies for the illegal trespass,
search, and seizure are “inconsistent or even hostile” to the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights and likely unavailing for our low290
income beneficiary. Looking to federal remedies for help, the individual has two forms of recourse under the Food Stamp Program: a
criminal prosecution against the officers or a civil monetary penalty
291
instituted by the Secretary of Agriculture against the officers. In ei292
ther situation, the individual has no possibility of recovery. Moreover, the Food Stamp Program purports to limit other federal reme293
If the Secretary of
dies beyond the four corners of the statute.
Agriculture determines that prosecuting the federal officers under
the criminal law is the most appropriate way to proceed, the officers’
287

Id. § 2024(b)(2), (c), (g), (h).
Id. § 2024(b)(1). The broad language of that criminal law calls for punishment for “whoever” misuses a food stamp and is not limited to members of qualified
households who are guilty of misuse. Id.
289
Notably, a “food stamp” is no longer a tangible item that can best be described
as a physical stamp. Instead, the monetary benefit that a household receives is accessible through an electronic card (similar to a debit or credit card) that members
of the household possess and can use at qualified stores to purchase goods. Id. §
2016(i)(1).
290
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 394 (1971).
291
7 U.S.C. §§ 2021(f), 2024(b)(1) (2006).
292
Under the civil monetary penalty provision, damages awards go to the government. Id. § 2024(f).
293
Id. § 2022(a)(1).
288
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conviction would entitle the government to restitution of the statuto294
Under
ry benefit but would leave the victim wanting a remedy.
those circumstances, if the victim brought a Bivens claim seeking
monetary relief for the unconstitutional taking, a federal court apparently would be presented with the precise question of whether
Congress intended § 2024(b) of the Act to be the victim’s only recourse in obtaining relief.
C. Constitutional Adequacy of a Criminal Law
To answer the above question of whether a criminal law could
adequate redress a constitutional injury, a federal court must first determine whether the statutory relief is constitutionally adequate. Although that principle is not noticeably apparent, Bush and Chilicky
are particularly informative. In both cases, the Court stressed that it
was not faced with the task of implying a damages remedy in the face
295
of constitutionally inadequate relief crafted by Congress.
Instead,
the Court was being asked to fashion Bivens relief when Congress already provided “meaningful” and “adequate” remedies to vindicate
296
the underlying right. Wilkie gives further credence to that proposition. In that case, the Court stated that it sustained Bivens remedies
only in two types of cases: where a plaintiff lacked any congressional
relief and where a plaintiff’s statutory relief was inadequate to secure
297
his constitutional right. Thus, the Court seems to suggest, without
directly saying, that the Court fashioned Bivens relief in those instances, at least in part, because it found that the plaintiff’s relief was
constitutionally inadequate. To make that finding then, the Court
must have independently assessed the constitutional adequacy of the
statutory remedy before concluding that Bivens relief was inappro298
priate.
The role that the Court appears to have carved out for itself in
ensuring the constitutional validity of a congressional remedy is rela-

294

Id. § 2024(b)(2), (c), (g), (h).
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
386 (1983).
296
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425; Bush, 462 U.S. at 386.
297
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007).
298
If the Court did not independently assess the constitutional adequacy of the
statutory remedies at issue in Carlson and Davis, then the Court must have fashioned
the Bivens remedies because Congress considered its own remedies to be constitutionally inadequate. And that proposition is highly unlikely (if not illogical).
295
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299

tively uncontroversial.
The federal judiciary has the duty to “say
300
If the judiciary
what the law is” and interpret the Constitution.
were to mechanically defer to statutory remedies, the court would in
effect be sanctioning Congress to put a stamp of constitutionality on
Congress’s own relief without judicial scrutiny of that decision. That
abdication of the judicial power would not only appear to violate the
Constitution but would also undermine the judicial branch’s legitimacy as protector of that document. Because of those grave constitutional repercussions, separation of powers arguably requires federal
courts to independently review the constitutionality of any congressional remedy.
At this point, it is important to emphasize again that the Court’s
Bivens cases strongly suggest that the federal court should decide
301
whether to craft a freestanding remedy in damages.
According to
Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, the constitutionality of an alternative remedy is clearly material to the question of whether a federal court
should fashion additional relief, but such an alternative remedy does
302
not compel a federal court to act in a certain way. Ultimately, if it
determines that the congressionally provided relief is constitutionally
inadequate to vindicate the violated right, a federal court must determine whether a Bivens damages remedy is nonetheless appropriate
303
given the circumstances. That common law method of adjudication
necessarily involves consideration of larger governmental concerns
about whether to make federal officers liable in damages when Congress has not done so.
Thus, the next issue becomes whether the prosecution of a criminal law is ever sufficient to guarantee a particular constitutional
right. The adequacy of a mode of relief necessarily depends on the
304
right at issue and the context surrounding its deprivation.
At the
outset, however, it should be apparent that the victim of an unlawful
299

Most commentators agree that the federal judiciary has not entirely abdicated
its role in gauging the constitutionality of congressional remedies. See Bandes, supra
note 100, at 320–22; Dellinger, supra note 16, at 1549; Nichol, supra note 16, at 1121.
300
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
301
See supra Part II.B.
302
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988) (“The absence of statutory
relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not by any means necessarily imply that
courts should award money damages against the officers responsible for the violation.”).
303
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597, 2600–01 (2007).
304
See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 n.9 (1994) (noting that damages remedies are appropriate for certain types of constitutional violations but not for others).
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act must be able to receive some type of direct recompense—either
retrospectively or prospectively—for any remedy to be deemed ade305
For example, a torture victim’s claims for relief for an
quate.
Eighth Amendment deprivation could hardly be satisfied merely by
the criminal conviction of the responsible federal agents. One who
has suffered a legally cognizable injury must be afforded some type of
recovery that is tangible and real to give substance to his violated in306
terest.
1.

Restitution

Few criminal laws provide direct relief to the victim. The obvious shortcoming of § 2024(b) of the Food Stamp Program is that it
gives the government, rather than the victim, recovery from the de307
fendant for his crime. Section 2024(b) therefore falls short of alleviating the victim’s injury in a manner required by the Constitution.
A criminal law, however, could possibly provide direct relief to
the victim. Restitution is the most obvious example. Restitution returns to the victim his property or the benefits denied to him as the
308
result of a crime, but restitution does not provide him with com309
pensatory damages for the deprivation his rights.
When restitution is tied to a criminal law or statute, it is either
mandatory or within the discretion of federal judges to provide that
310
form of relief. Because constitutional rights are at stake, however,
305

Steinman, supra note 70, at 283, 321. That may also be inferred from the
Court’s language in Bush and Chilicky. Part of the reason why the Court found the
remedies implicated in those cases to be “meaningful” is because the victim of the
unconstitutional act could directly benefit from their application. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
at 423–25; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983).
306
That is opposed to the psychological benefit that may arise from the satisfaction of seeing the transgressor punished by the government and sent to jail or fined.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 395–97 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Nichol, supra note 16, at 1122. But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978); Fallon, supra note 17, 329–39, 366–72.
307
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(2), (c), (g), (h) (2006).
308
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009). If the perpetrator of an illegal
act cannot restore the ill-gotten property or benefits, restitution may take the form of
monetary relief. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4
(Tentative Draft 2000). Such monetary relief is usually determined with reference to
the fair market value of the property or benefits at the time of restoration. Id. §§ 4,
48.
309
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt.
310
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006) (providing discretionary restitution to the
victims of certain enumerated crimes); id. § 3663A (providing mandatory restitution).
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relief should be guaranteed and not discretionary. Indeed, a right is
hardly adequately secured when the relief is contingent upon judicial
notions of fairness rather than guaranteed to the victim.
When mandatory restitution is required under a criminal law,
the victim is afforded relief after the defendant is convicted of the
311
crime. Generally speaking, the victim is given notice of the sentencing hearing and the right to submit sworn affidavits to the court stat312
The
ing the value of property or money taken by the defendant.
prosecution, however, has to prove the extent of the victim’s damages
313
by a preponderance of the evidence.
The victim’s affidavits are
compiled into a presentence report, which is given to the sentencing
314
judge. When a judge makes an order of restitution, the victim can
enforce it in any jurisdiction and may ask for lump-sum or periodic
315
payments.
2.

The Circumstances in Which Restitution Is Adequate

Even though restitution is not likely to fully compensate the vic316
tim of an unconstitutional act, it still may nonetheless be adequate
given the type of constitutional injury asserted and circumstances sur317
rounding the violation.
Without describing the universe of situations in which restitution could adequately redress a constitutional injury, accurately describing at least a few instances in which the Court
has found restitution to be sufficient is possible. The most prominent
example occurs, as in Bush and Chilicky, where the alleged constitutional infringement results in the denial of a statutory benefit or
right. Here, the constitutional deprivation is indistinct from the statutory deprivation in question, and the restoration of the statutory
318
right is sufficient to compensate both injuries.
For example, the
Chilicky Court expressly recognized that the return of a statutory
right, which in that case was the collection of disability benefits after

311

Id. § 3664(a).
Id. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(iii)–(vi).
313
Id. § 3664(e).
314
Id. § 3664(d)(4).
315
Id. § 3664(f)(3)(A), (m)(1)(B).
316
See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (holding that restoration of disability benefits was incomplete but nonetheless satisfactory to fully redress
plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (holding
that reinstatement of position and back payment for Free Speech retaliatory action
was incomplete but sufficient to redress constitutional injuries).
317
See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428; Bush, 462 U.S. at 388.
318
Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428–29.
312

ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT)

1400

1/13/2010 5:25 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1359

months of suffering and delay, was enough to address the plaintiffs’
statutory claims as well as vindicate their due process right for the un319
Similarly, back payment and reinstatement of posilawful denial.
tion were adequate to secure the plaintiff’s guarantee of Free Speech
in Bush even though the relief appeared to directly address statutory
320
violations of the Civil Service Reform Act.
Further, restitution is
normally adequate when the alleged constitutional deprivation is one
321
that involves a Takings Clause violation by federal officers.
Finally, the fact that a federal officer may be judgment proof
does not render restitution, or any other form of relief, inadequate to
vindicate a constitutional right. Issues of immunity, according to
Meyer and Malesko, are analytically distinct and entirely separate from
the question of whether a federal court should fashion a new remedy
322
in damages under Bivens. Indeed, the very purpose of a federal officer’s immunity is to protect him from culpability for his constitu323
tional transgressions. Therefore, to defeat the adequacy of an existing remedy that is in fact unobtainable because the federal defendant
may shield himself from liability is no excuse.
In the present context, a criminal law offering mandatory restitution is likely to be substantively adequate in cases involving the taking of a property right, such as a statutory benefit or entitlement. In
such cases, the federal officer’s unconstitutional usurpation of the
benefit violates the beneficiary’s statutory and constitutional rights.
The return or restoration of that benefit is enough to compensate
both injuries such that additional recourse under Bivens is unwarranted.
3.

Procedural Concerns

Although this Comment has addressed the Wilson Court’s twin
concerns of congressional intent to preclude Bivens and giving the
victim recourse, that does not end the inquiry into whether a criminal
law can remedy a constitutional violation. The existence of additional aspects of any remedy that factor into the determination of wheth319

Id.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 386; see also Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 428 (describing Bush as
standing for the proposition that when the constitutional injury cannot be separated
from the statutory injury, the statutory remedy is generally sufficient to redress both
claims).
321
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. La. 1972).
322
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70–71 (2001); FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
323
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
320
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er the remedy passes constitutional muster should be apparent. Indeed, the Court in Chilicky acknowledged as much by recognizing
that additional “safeguards” are intertwined with any remedy and fac324
tor into its constitutionality.
That shows that the Court was concerned with the entire process of the alternative remedy when gauging
325
its adequateness rather than the level or amount of relief. The deficiency of an alternative congressional remedy in those procedural
safeguards presumably is constitutionally inadequate and, thus, an insufficient reason to stay a federal court’s Bivens power. What the
Court means by “procedural safeguards” is unclear, but that term
seems to be rooted in our traditional notions of due process in giving
326
the claimant notice and a fair opportunity to be heard. That seems
relatively uncontroversial because a remedy could hardly be considered sufficient if the procedures or mechanisms required to invoke
the remedy are nearly impossible to satisfy or at least unduly burdensome to vindicate the underlying right.
In respect of considering a criminal law’s “procedural safeguards” to measure its constitutional adequacy, some problems arise.
The inherent procedural shortcomings of criminal laws, as compared
to other tort-based forms of relief that the Court has found palatable
to foreclose Bivens relief, are numerable. First, criminal laws take the
cause of action out of the hands of the victim and place it with the
327
prosecution.
In the context of the present discussion, that would
mean that federal prosecutors (and ultimately the Executive Branch)
would have the sole responsibility and power in vindicating a victim’s
constitutional rights. Generally speaking, third-party standing is only
328
permissible under certain discrete circumstances. That prohibition
324

Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425. The Court emphasized in Chilicky the “elaborate” nature of Title II of the Social Security Act, which contained a “[multi]-step process for
the review and adjudication of disputed claims.” Id. at 424 (citing Heckler v. Day,
467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984)).
325
Id.
326
See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228, 236 (1941).
327
See Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2239, 2247 (1999) (“[O]ur long-standing practice (albeit one not required by
Article III) is that the victim of the crime may not bring a federal criminal prosecution.”); see also Harold J. Kent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 293 (1989).
328
Where parties stand in such a relationship that the exercise of a person’s constitutional right is dependent upon a third party being allowed to engage in particular conduct, the Court has found third-party standing permissible. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195–96 (1976). Third-party standing is also permissible to challenge substantially overbroad statutes on Free Speech grounds even if the application
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is not directly implicated here because the government has standing
329
to prosecute the federal wrongdoer for his criminal act. Nonetheless, the proposition that a criminal law can vindicate a victim’s rights
may indirectly undermine that principle. The government’s reasons
for prosecuting the federal wrongdoer may genuinely be at odds with,
or tangential to, the victim’s desire to obtain relief. That misalignment of interests could very well lend itself to less-than-adequate representation on the prosecutor’s part and, ultimately, undermine the
victim’s constitutional right itself.
Further, having a criminal law act as a constitutional remedy may
be particularly egregious to our notions of Due Process and Equal
Protection. Although the restitution process described above does
give the victim the bare minimum of notice of the proceedings and
an opportunity to submit sworn affidavits regarding the extent of his
330
damages, the notice provision and opportunity to be heard come
331
after the defendant’s conviction. Under the American criminal system, the government is the prosecution and controls all aspects of the
litigation, and the victim has only limited rights to immerse himself in
332
the prosecution’s case-in-chief against the defendant. The governof the statute is legal as applied to the plaintiff. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 615 (1973).
329
See Hartnett, supra note 327, at 2248–49; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source
of Congress’s Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 554 (1995).
330
18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(iii)–(vi) (2006).
331
Id. § 3664(a).
332
A mandamus action is one way in which the victim of a crime may try to compel a federal prosecutor to bring charges against the criminal actor. Id. § 3771. In
fact, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act expressly grants the criminal victim the statutory
right to immerse himself in the government’s criminal case against the defendant.
Id. § 3771(a)(1)–(8). To enforce those rights, the statute allows the criminal victim
to seek mandamus against the prosecution. Id. § 3771(d). Specifically, those provisions state the following:
(1) Rights.—The crime victim or the crime victim’s lawful representative, and the attorney for the Government may assert the rights described in subsection (a). . . .
....
(3) Motion for relief and writ of mandamus.—The rights described in
subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.
The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim’s right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the
movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. . . .
The court of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall
proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five
days for purposes of enforcing [this section]. If the court of appeals

ROBINSON (FINAL EDIT)

2009]

1/13/2010 5:25 PM

COMMENT

1403

ment’s discretion and authority not to prosecute a federal officer at
all regardless of the victim’s need for recovery are especially offen333
sive. If that were to happen, the victim would be left wanting a remedy without any means of obtaining it. In fact, a federal court may
not even consider a criminal law within a comprehensive congressional scheme as an alternative remedy to the plaintiff.
Finally, the substantially higher burden of proof imposed in
334
criminal cases as compared to civil cases is most problematic. Thus,
the prosecution must go to great lengths to prove the defendant’s
culpability before relief may be obtained by the victim. Why should it
be made harder to protect constitutional rights from invasion? The
idea that the criminal process should be a source of vindication for
America’s most valued and treasured rights seems patently inconsistent with the notion that the Constitution codifies those rights. If anything, constitutional rights should be easily vindicable to ensure and
promote the values those rights embody and to keep the government
within the parameters of the law.
Although those reasons present a formidable barrier, they are
not an absolute bar to viewing criminal laws as adequate to vindicate
certain constitutional rights. Initially, the prohibition on third-party
denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be clearly
stated on the record in a written opinion.
Id. § 3771(d)(1), (3).
But given the discretionary nature of the decision whether to prosecute, a mandamus action would not likely succeed in most, if not all cases, given federal court
hesitancy to compel federal actors to perform discretionary functions. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803) (“It is not by the office of the person
to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be determined. Where the head of a
department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which
he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a
court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation);
see also Jarrett v. Ashcroft, 24 Fed. App’x 503, 504 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that mandamus action could not lie against Attorney General or United States Attorney to investigate or prosecute alleged civil rights violators); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640,
643 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that investigation by FBI is a “clearly discretionary act”
and that a federal district court lacked the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to
force an employee of the FBI to initiate an investigation of an alleged crime).
333
The fact that federal prosecutors may not appeal an adverse judgment given
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution is additionally offensive. U.S. CONST.
amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb”); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445–47 (1970).
334
To hold the accused liable for his actions, the prosecution is required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime. See Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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standing is only a prudential limitation on a party’s access to Article
335
III courts. Arguments against criminal laws as a source of constitutional vindication rest on the supposition that the victim is in the best
position to assert his or her case. The Court has made clear several
336
times, however, that most Bivens claimants sit on their rights. Often
times, a plaintiff does not seek relief for his injury because he believes
that the federal officer will evade liability on qualified-immunity
337
grounds. Many Bivens claimants, in fact, wait until the last minute
338
to ask the federal judiciary to give them a better remedy. That “better remedy” is generally unavailing, and a Bivens claimant is ultimately
left with no relief whatsoever because of statute-of-limitations prob339
lems. Other instances exist in which an individual who has suffered
a constitutional injury may not seek redress. The victim may not even
be aware that he has suffered a constitutional deprivation, may consider the injury too insignificant to warrant civil action, or may lack
the resources or time to pursue his claims.
Building on that point, the federal government also acceptably
could secure an injured party’s constitutional rights via the criminal
process. Federal prosecutors may have more resources and time to
challenge the unlawful acts of a federal officer. That is likely to be
true when the Bivens claimant is indigent or on fixed income and receiving monetary assistance from federal-entitlement statutes, such as
Title II or the Food Stamp program. In such cases, the simple fact
that litigation is expensive and time-consuming may dissuade a private litigant from seeking the possibility of relief. Moreover, a federal
prosecutor’s independent interest in pursuing a criminal action may
actually lend itself to greater zeal and tenacity in pursuing colorful or
difficult-to-prove claims that the victim might not find worthwhile.
Finally, federal prosecutors may have more legal training than a private litigant, which may manifest itself in better representation of the
victim’s interests.
The more difficult question to address is in respect of the higher
burden of proof standing in the way of a constitutional right’s vindication. Obviously, Americans want their most treasured rights to be
free from invasion, and consistent with that desire, the burden of
335

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194–96 (1976).
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 485 (1994).
337
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72; Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
338
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (noting that the plaintiff had failed to avail himself of
available administrative remedies).
339
Id.
336
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proof to establish a constitutional violation is generally placed at a
lower threshold. Even though the bar is set lower, however, the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity and federal sovereignty
seemingly make it more difficulty for the victim of an unconstitution340
al act to redress his injuries. Indeed, for constitutional injuries resulting from the actions of a federal officer, qualified immunity will
almost always present the victim with a sizeable obstacle that may be
insurmountable in a given case and, thus, may ultimately result in the
341
victim having no remedy. As Meyer and Malesko hold, issues of im342
munity do not factor into Bivens determinations. But the point to
be made here is that a criminal law is not so clearly constitutionally
inadequate because it imposes a higher burden of proof; other doctrines exist that make the easy vindication of a constitutional interest
an illusion.
D. Why a Criminal Law Should Vindicate a Constitutional Right
The final and perhaps most difficult question to answer is why a
federal court should show deference to a congressional scheme containing only criminal laws as a source of constitutional vindication.
As has been pressed throughout this Comment, Bivens is a commonlaw doctrine of constitutional proportions: a federal court has the
power, but not the duty, to fashion damages relief as it sees fit for al343
leged constitutional violations committed by federal officers.
Crucial to any federal court’s decision regarding Bivens liability has been
whether the claimant has access to an adequate, alternative remedial
344
process. When he does, his need for a judicially created remedy is
viewed as less pressing than in the case of a claimant who has no remedy, and other separation-of-powers concerns, such as the need to
show deference to a comprehensive statutory scheme, are likely to
345
outweigh the claimant’s Bivens demands.
340

See generally Maine v. Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity prevents a state from being sued in its own courts under federal causes of action); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that state officers generally
have qualified immunity from suits for damages unless the officers have violated
clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable officer would have known
were being violated); see also Fallon, supra note 17, at 329–39, 366–72.
341
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
342
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 (noting that “Meyer made clear that the threat of litigation and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes no matter
that they may enjoy qualified immunity”); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
343
See supra Parts II.B, III.A.
344
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007).
345
See supra Part III.B.2.
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The result of that process has arguably provided Congress greater authority and leeway in giving effect and substance to constitutional norms. At face value, that result is attractive: because Congress is
accountable to the people, Congress should have the primary responsibility of shaping relief for deprivations of constitutional values.
That result also seems justifiable on a separation-of-powers ground.
When Congress creates a statutory right, Congress makes a policy de346
cision as to the appropriate relief for the deprivation of that right.
Congress can decide that the right is not important enough to warrant significant protection even in the face of unconstitutional infringement upon that right. Congress can also decide that the federal government is better equipped or in a better position to handle all
violations of the right even when such a violation implicates the Constitution. In essence, a statutory benefit vindicable only through the
criminal process may reflect Congress’s attitudes toward that right.
Regardless of congressional motive, the federal judiciary should respect and defer to the democratically elected branch’s determination
of appropriate relief for a statutory, and ultimately constitutional, injury.
Even assuming, as Justice Harlan stated in Bivens, that the Bill of
Rights exists to protect an individual’s interests from the majority’s
will, which is expressed in the legislature, that does not lead to the
conclusion that federal courts must therefore actively announce constitutional norms without showing deference to Congress. Indeed,
Justice Harlan himself justified the Court’s creation of a remedy in
Bivens by noting that a damages action brought directly under the
Constitution by a remedy-less claimant would be a very rare occa347
sion and that no strong countervailing federal interests were at
348
Moreover, the Court’s envisioned role in Bivens actions has
stake.
not led to a total abdication of its power to interpret and establish
those norms. The Court has routinely and independently assessed
the constitutionality of the congressional remedies in its Bivens cases
and has been willing to give damages when it finds the congressional

346

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411–12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Nichol, supra note 16, at 1143.
347
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409–11 (Harlan, J., concurring).
348
Id. at 411 (“Of course, for a variety of reasons, the [Bivens] remedy may not often be sought. . . . I deem it proper to venture the thought that at the very least [the
Bivens] remedy would be available for the most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts
of police conduct.”).
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relief constitutionally inadequate.
Thus, the Court has effectively
staked out a middle ground between its dual needs to protect individual rights and to defer to Congress’s authority to create constitutional remedies. Therefore, a federal court’s cessation of its Bivens
power because of the existence of a criminal law fits within the
framework that the Court has constructed in which the courts defer
to congressional remedies where those remedies are adequate to secure a constitutional right.
Additionally, federal courts preferably should permit Congress
to experiment with unconventional or atypical constitutional remedies. The simple fact that Congress has failed to provide the “traditional” relief of damages does not, and should not, imply that Congress has not created a mechanism that will adequately safeguard a
victim’s constitutional rights. In fact, given the punitive nature of
criminal laws, it may be that a victim’s constitutional guarantees will
be more secure under the unconventional scheme created by Congress than if a damages remedy were available to enforce the right at
issue. In the context of certain statutory schemes, criminal laws may
be the easiest method—at least compared to a damages action—of circumscribing unconstitutional conduct.
Finally, if a criminal law is still undesirable as a constitutional
remedy even though such a remedy may represent congressional preference, a criminal law may still preclude Bivens relief where the Bivens claim is brought after a successful criminal prosecution. Consider a comprehensive congressional scheme like the Food Stamp
program that entitles certain individuals with a benefit and uses criminal laws with mandatory restitution to enforce its provisions. Even if
a federal court believes that the criminal law lacks the procedural safeguards necessary for the security of the constitutional right at issue,
the victim has already obtained substantively adequate relief as a result of the prior criminal conviction and restitution. Thus, the federal court must decide whether Bivens relief is permissible when an inadequate process has resulted in adequate relief. Under that narrow
circumstance, preclusion of Bivens relief might be acceptable because
the victim’s injury is redressed, and a federal court would have little
incentive to fashion a new damages remedy, especially with the likely
separation-of-powers criticisms that come with any Bivens decision.

349

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
Attempting to fit a criminal remedy with mandatory restitution
within the Court’s jurisprudence of declining to extend Bivens-type
remedies is not an easy task. The Bivens case dealt with the power of
a federal court to give a civil damages remedy to an individual whose
constitutional rights had been violated by a federal officer. In the
cases subsequent to Bivens, the Court has substantially dealt with the
same question of whether fashioning such a remedy for a constitutional violation without statutory authorization is prudent. Substituting a Bivens tort remedy for a congressionally created criminal action
with mandatory restitution seems patently illogical given the Court’s
jurisprudence in that area. But that statement fails to consider the
core concerns of the Court when presented with a Bivens claim.
As the Court has made clear many times, Bivens and its progeny
are really about the federal judiciary and Congress deterring federal
officers from violating the Constitution. Grandiose themes of separation of powers and institutional competency resonate loudly
throughout those cases, and often times the victim’s demands for full
and complete compensation are lost in the cacophony. That discord
reflects the enormous discomfort that the Court feels in embracing
its implied remedy-making power, which is further exacerbated when
Congress has provided alternative relief for constitutional infringements.
A criminal law with mandatory restitution is, at one level, no different from any other congressionally created remedy in the context
of Bivens. The completeness or form of the relief is not in question
when a Bivens case comes before a federal court; the question is
whether the federal judiciary finds a convincing reason to fashion a
new damages remedy. The recent trend in Bivens jurisprudence is to
deny an implied damages action if the victim has any alternative federal remedies at his disposal. Taking the leap to preclude a Bivens
remedy based on the existence of an alternative criminal law with
mandatory restitution is not as farfetched as it seems at first glance, as
that form of relief arguably satisfies the minimum criteria to be constitutionally adequate. Therefore, given the appropriate circumstances, a federal court may decide, under its traditional common-law
powers, that a criminal law with mandatory restitution may be an acceptable way to vindicate a constitutional right and, thus, that an implied damages remedy under Bivens is unnecessary.

